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Though corporate bond markets can play important roles for 
East Asia's sustainable growth, it is very difficult to build a 
well-functioning corporate bond market. One of the reasons for 
the difficulty is that the hurdles to be overcome are closely 
related each other, resulting in a chicken or egg problem. This 
paper shows that the chicken or egg problem may come from 
externalities in corporate bond markets and analyzes the 
interaction of the externalities: dynamic externality and static 
network externality. Some policy implications are drawn from 
the results.
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I. Introduction
In most developing East Asian countries, bond markets are small 
relative to banking systems. Especially, corporate bond markets are 
quite small. As written in many theoretical articles, if bank lending 
can proxy for all debt, we need not worry about the lagging corporate 
bond markets. However, the relationship banking system, which is 
dominant in several East Asian countries, can cause or exacerbate 
soft budget constraint problems or hold-up problems.
Soft budget constraint problems (or ever-greening) arise when a 
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bank cannot deny additional credit when a borrower gets in trouble. 
A borrower on the verge of defaulting may approach the bank for 
more credit to forestall default. A bank that has already loaned 
money may well decide to extend further credit in the hope of 
recovering its previous loan, while the bank would not if it has no 
previous relationship with the borrower. Borrowers who realize that 
they can renegotiate their contracts ex post might have perverse 
incentives ex ante.
Hold-up problems arise when the proprietary information obtained 
by banks about borrowers give the banks an information monopoly. 
Since the bank can threaten the borrower firm not to extend credit, 
the borrower faces a liquidity risk. Banks could charge high loan 
interest rates as a result.
Broad, deep and resilient corporate bond markets have also 
become increasingly important from the perspectives of policy 
makers. Many of them contend the absence of bond markets leaves 
Asian economies more vulnerable to financial crisis. As Alan 
Greenspan pointed out, the bank-dominated Asian economies need a 
“spare tire.”1
A well-functioning corporate bond market can give various benefits 
to the economy.2 Without it, firms may face a higher cost of funds 
and bias their investment policies toward short-term assets and 
away from entrepreneurial ventures. In addition, a well-functioning 
bond market provides an investment option to savers. Finally, 
efficient bond markets provide a significant source of information 
through market-derived interest rates. This information is lost 
without a well-functioning bond market.
In brief, corporate bond markets play important roles for East 
Asia's sustainable growth. However, building a well-functioning 
bond-market is very difficult, empirically. The next section offers an 
overview of East Asia's corporate bond markets. Section III discusses 
the difficulties in establishing well-functioning corporate bond 
markets and suggests a simple explanatory model. Section IV 
concludes with some policy implications.
1
...... The failure to have alternative forms of intermediation was of little 
consequence so long as the primary means worked. That is, the lack of a 
spare tire is of no concern if you do not get a flat. East Asia had no spare 
tires ...... (Greenspan 2000).
2 For a detailed explanation on the benefits of a corporate bond market, 
see Herring and Chatusripitak (2000).
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TABLE 1
SIZE OF BOND MARKETS (DOMESTIC BONDS OUTSTANDING)
1997 2004
US$ billions % of GDP US$ billions % of GDP
China 116.4 12.9 483.3  24.9
Hong Kong 45.8 25.9 76.8  46.3
Indonesia 4.5  1.9 57.7  22.7
Japan 4,433.6 97.6 8,866.7 197.7
Korea 130.3 25.1 568.3  83.2
Malaysia 57.0 57.0 106.6  90.0
Philippines 18.5 22.3 25.0  28.8
Singapore 23.7 24.7 78.6  73.1
Thailand 10.7  7.1 66.5  41.1
Memo: United States 12,656.9 62.9 19,186.6 161.6
Sources: ADB Asian Bonds Online and World Bank staff calculations, cited 
in Ghosh (2006).
II. Overview of Corporate Bond Markets in Asia 3
Bond markets have grown rapidly over the past few years in East 
Asia as can be seen in Table 1. In most countries in the region, 
much of the initial impetus to growth did not come from corporate 
bonds but from government bonds issued primarily to restructure 
banking systems following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. From 
1997 to 2004, government-issued bonds accounted for more than 50 
percent of East Asia's regional bond market growth (excluding Hong 
Kong, China, and Korea). The corporate bond market 4 remains quite 
small as a proportion of total bonds outstanding in most countries 
(Table 2). Moreover, according to Ghosh (2006), the proportion of 
quasi-government issuance is big in the East Asian corporate bond 
markets. Since quasi-government issuers are likely to borrow with 
government guarantees against default, they are likely to obtain the 
highest-quality credit available domestically.
3
The explanation in this section mainly depends on Ghosh (2006) and 
Gyntelberg and Remolona (2005).
4
In this paper, corporate bonds refer to all non-government long-term debt 
issues in a given currency. They include quasi-government issuers, financial 
and non-financial issuers and both resident and non-resident issuers.
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TABLE 2
BREAKDOWN BY TYPE OF BOND ISSUER
1997 (% of GDP) 2004 (% of GDP)























China  7.5  0.7  4.7 14.8  0.6  9.5 60.7 -0.3 39.3
Hong Kong  7.4 18.5  0.0  9.5 36.8  0.0 10.3 89.7  0.0
Indonesia  0.4  0.8  0.7 20.1  1.5  1.1 94.6  3.1  2.3
Korea  4.9 10.3 10.0 25.2 23.3 34.9 34.9 22.3 42.8
Malaysia 19.4 20.8 16.8 38.2 38.0 13.9 56.7 52.0 -8.8
Philippines 22.3  0.1  0.0 28.7  0.1  0.0 100.3 -0.3  0.0
Singapore 13.6 11.2  0.0 14.2 32.4  0.0 56.6 43.4  0.0
Thailand  0.2  6.0  0.9 22.4 12.3  6.4 65.2 18.6 16.2
Sources: ADB, BIS, and country sources, cited in Ghosh (2006).
The secondary corporate bond markets in most East Asian 
countries are also said to lack liquidity, with relatively little trading 
activity. According to Gyntelberg and Remolona (2005), they have 
developed less than the primary markets. The following describes the 
recent developments in Asia's primary markets and the liquidity in 
secondary corporate bond markets.
A. Primary Markets
a) Market Size
At the end of 2004, Japan had the largest corporate bond market 
among eight East Asian countries. Its size is $2 trillion, accounting 
for more than two thirds of the total (Table 3). The next largest 
markets were Korea with $355 billion and China with $196 billion. 
These two markets can still be considered relatively large in the 
sense that they exceed the $100 billion threshold (estimated by 
McCauley and Remolona (2000) as the size required for a deep and 
liquid government bond market). Note that this threshold for 
corporate bond markets can be much higher, because corporate 
bond issues are more heterogeneous than government bonds and the 
issue sizes smaller.
However, with any other liquidity thresholds, the remaining 
corporate bond markets seem too small. The next largest market is 
Hong Kong with $62 billion, followed by Malaysia with $50 billion, 
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TABLE 3
SIZE OF CORPORATE BOND MARKETS AND OTHER FUNDING CHANNELS
(At the end of 2004)














China 195.9  10.6 154.4  33.4  18.0
Hong Kong 61.9  35.8 148.9 547.7   5.0
Indonesia 6.8   2.4  42.6  24.5  15.2
Japan 2,002.0  41.7 146.9  76.9 117.2
Korea 355.6  49.3 104.2  74.7  23.7
Malaysia 49.7  38.8 113.9 140.8  36.1
Philippines 0.2   0.2  49.8  37.5  21.8
Singapore 21.7  18.6  70.1 211.4  27.6
Thailand 31.9  18.3  84.9  67.1  18.5
Memo: United States 15,116.6 128.8  89.0 138.4  42.5
Note: Defined as bonds and notes issued in the country's currency by 
either residents or non-residents, in both domestic and international 
markets. 
Sources: IMF; World Federation of Exchanges; Dealogic Bondware; national 
data; BIS, cited in Gyntelberg and Remolona (2005).
then Thailand with $32 billion, and Singapore with $22 billion. Two 
other economies ― Indonesia and the Philippines ― have even 
smaller markets.
It is not surprising that the deepest corporate bond markets are 
those of the higher income economies ― Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
and Malaysia. In each of these countries, as shown in Table 3, the 
size of the market exceeds 25% of GDP. It is also unsurprising that 
the shallow markets relative to GDP are those of the lower-income 
economies ― China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. However, the 
size of the market would depend also on its level of development and 
the competition among financing alternatives on either the issuer or 
investor side.
b) Composition of Issuers
The types of issuers in a given market can be a good indication 
about how well developed the market is. For example, investors 
would find it worthwhile to evaluate large firms' credit quality based 
on publicly available information. The presence of non-resident 
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TABLE 4
LOCAL CURRENCY CORPORATE BONDS BY RESIDENCE OF ISSUER











China 195.9 100.0   0.0  0.0
Hong Kong 27.3  44.1  34.6 55.9
Indonesia 6.8  99.8   0.0  0.2
Japan 1,646.1  82.2 355.9 17.8
Korea 355.2  99.9   0.4  0.1
Malaysia 49.5  99.6   0.2  0.4
Philippines 0.2  86.8   0.0 13.2
Singapore 13.9  64.0   7.8 36.0
Thailand 31.8  99.8   0.1  0.2
Memo: United States 13,535.9  89.5 1,580.7 10.5
Sources: Dealogic Bondware, BIS, cited in Gyntelberg and Remolona (2005).
issuers shows that the market is able to provide funds on terms that 
are competitive with those available in other currencies.
In many markets of East Asia, issuers seem to be concentrated 
near the high end of the credit quality spectrum. In Malaysia, about 
40% of the market consists of issuers with the local ratings of 
triple-A and another 40% of issuers with double-A ratings. In Korea, 
about 80% are single-A or better.
As stated above, many corporate bond markets in East Asia have 
been driven by quasi-government issuance. Gyntelberg and Remolona 
(2005) suggest another indication of the importance of quasi- 
government issuers in Asian corporate bond markets. The composi- 
tion of the HSBC Asian Local Bond Index (ALBI) is designed to track 
the performance of liquid local currency bonds in China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
(China), and Thailand. Though the index has a large number of 
constituent issues and includes non-government ones, these non- 
government constituent issues are restricted to quasi-government 
borrowers.
The presence of foreign issuers may also indicate how well 
developed a market is. It may reflect the efforts of policy makers in a 
small economy to find ways to develop their markets. As in Table 4, 
Hong Kong and Singapore Dollar markets have the highest 
proportions of non-resident issuers, with these issuers comprising 
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56% and 36% of the market, respectively.
B. Liquidity in Corporate Bond Markets in East Asia
Before considering the problems of liquidity in the Asian markets, 
it is worthwhile to note that even a large market such as the United 
States is not perfectly liquid. In contrast to stocks, corporate bonds 
are infrequently traded through dealers rather than exchanges. The 
lack of liquidity is due to a lack of trading activity in general, rather 
than any overall imbalance between buyers and sellers. The 
corporate bond dealer helps address this liquidity problem by holding 
an inventory of bonds. The dealer makes money by selling at a 
higher price than it bought. A dealer also provides liquidity by 
actively trying to find buyers and sellers for different bonds. Whereas 
bid-ask spreads in the inter-dealer market for US Treasury securities 
are less than 1 basis point, bid-ask spreads in the corporate bond 
market are about 3 to 5 basis points.
In the last few years government bond markets in East Asia have 
become reasonably liquid, while corporate bond markets remain 
relatively illiquid. Four factors are said to be keeping liquidity low in 
the Asian corporate bond markets: lack of diversity in the investor 
base, market opaqueness, inadequate market microstructures and a 
limited flow of timely information about issuers to creditors.
a) Diversity of Investor Base
In a market with a diverse investor base, it is less likely that 
different investors will find themselves on the same side of the 
market, either as sellers or buyers. Since the investors are more 
likely to disagree on the credit quality of an issuer or the price of the 
bond, they are more willing to trade. In addition, they are less likely 
to need liquidity at the same time. Most East Asian corporate bond 
markets lack such diversity. Their investor bases tends to be 
dominated by government-controlled provident funds, insurance 
companies and banks. Once a bond is issued, it normally disappears 
into the portfolios of buy-and-hold investors, and those who might 
trade more actively, such as fixed income funds and hedge funds, 
are typically missing from these markets. Most of institutional 
investors in these markets have internal guidelines that limit them to 
investing only in highly rated securities.
Another important class of investors missing from East Asian 
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markets is the foreign investor class, including global financial 
companies. In general, various market impediments discourage them 
from participating in these markets. Among these impediments are 
withholding taxes and the lack of repurchase markets.
b) Market Opaqueness
A second factor affecting liquidity is trading transparency, which is 
limited in many East Asian corporate bond markets. Transparency 
encourages competitive pricing and makes investors confident they 
are getting good prices. The experiences of the US tell us about the 
importance of market transparency in the development of corporate 
bond markets.
Recently, some Asian markets have started to enact reporting 
requirements similar to that of US Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (TRACE). Much of this transparency, however, has been 
limited to dealers. In addition, the reporting requirements are not 
enforced in some cases. A good example is from the Korea Security 
Dealers Association (KSDA) which requires its member dealers to 
report their transactions within 15 minutes via its information 
distribution system. Since the information disseminated via the 
system to the public can reveal their positions and strategies, most 
Korean corporate bond dealers are reluctant to open their 
transaction information.
c) Market Microstructures
Bonds tend to trade more actively on over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets than on exchanges and trading on OTC markets needs 
well-functioning dealers. Inter-dealer brokers are also needed to allow 
dealers to trade with each other anonymously. Such microstructures 
have often required government encouragement to establish. In many 
East Asian countries, as in the US, primary dealers and market- 
makers for government securities are appointed by the authorities 
and required to make markets for government securities. Compared 
to government bonds, corporate bonds are handicapped by the fact 
that issues tend to be heterogeneous and issue sizes tend to be 
smaller. Hence, they may require even more help from the 
authorities in setting up microstructures.
Some East Asian countries tried to foster corporate bond liquidity 
by listing bond issues on existing stock exchanges or even creating 
exchanges devoted to fixed-income securities. According to Gyntelberg 
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and Remolona (2005), however, trading so far remains concentrated 
in the OTC market. In Seoul, for instance, over 90% of the secondary 
trading in corporate bonds still takes place in the OTC market. In 
Thailand, the turnover ratio has been 30% in the OTC market and 
only 1% on the local exchange. In China, because of regulatory 
fragmentation, financial issues have been traded only on the local 
inter-bank OTC market, while non-financial names have been traded 
either on the two domestic stock exchanges or on the inter-bank 
OTC market.
The bid-ask spreads tend to be wide in several of the East Asian 
secondary markets for corporate bonds, because the markets are less 
competitive and thus discourage trading. In a number of markets, 
there tend to be one or two dealers for a single issue, often the lead 
underwriters. In addition, many dealers and brokers provide their 
quote sheets only to a limited and non-comparable subset of 
potential investors.
d) Flow of Information
The last but not the least important factor is the limited flow of 
timely information about issuers. In corporate bond markets, much 
liquidity can be generated by the activity of investors who disagree 
about fundamentals. Since such information-based trading provides 
spillover benefits to those who are in the market, trading tends to be 
active when there is a significant flow of information about the 
issuers' credit quality, etc.
Such information flows are often very limited in Asian markets. A 
large number of issues carry one form of government guarantee or 
another. In addition, some East Asian corporate bond markets are 
said to have a pattern in which financial reporting tends not to 
recognize losses in a timely way. One reason is the lack of incentives 
for timely reporting in the Asian context, where personal networks in 
business are so important. Although there are local credit rating 
agencies in most East Asian countries, many such rating agencies 
are quite new and need more time to develop a historical record on 
which to build a reputation. While a handful of foreign rating 
agencies such as Moody's and S&P are active in Asian markets, they 
often do not provide ratings across the full array of bond issuers in 
individual countries.
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III. Externalities in Corporate Bond Markets
The previous section gave an overview of the corporate bond 
markets in East Asia. There are many problems to overcome. 
Experiences with building well-functioning corporate bond markets 
tell us that these problems are very difficult to resolve and they are 
related each other. For example, a broad and diverse investor base is 
essential for well-functioning corporate bond markets. However, 
investors are reluctant to invest their money into assets which are 
listed and traded on a malfunctioning market.
Similarly, corporate bond dealers need to increase their ability to 
evaluate the issuers’ default risks and to price the corporate bonds. 
But the dealers are not willing to invest money to raise those 
abilities when only a few firms are expected to issue bonds. On the 
other hand, firms do not want to issue their bonds through the 
dealers with a poor ability of evaluating default risks, because the 
investors may require a premium on the corporate bonds as a 
compensation for the risks caused by the poor ability of the dealers.
The description above of the difficulties suggests the presence of a 
“chicken or egg” problem in the construction of well-functioning 
corporate bond markets. Dealers need many heterogeneous issuers 
to have an incentive to raise their ability to price the bonds correctly, 
but to convince firms to issue bonds, the dealers should be good at 
pricing bonds.
This “chicken or egg” problem arises because of externality of bond 
issuance. A firm’s bond issuance can benefit other firms through 
enhancing the dealer’s ability to evaluate corporate default risks. 
Furthermore, the externality has a dynamic property: a dealer with 
more bond pricing experience must be better at evaluating default 
risks and pricing corporate bonds.
There seems to be another kind of externality in corporate bond 
markets: network externality. Network externalities are said to exist 
when consumer utility in a certain market depends (usually, in a 
positive way) on consumption of the same good or service by other 
agents. Markets with network externalities have been widely 
analyzed, especially since the contributions by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985), and others. With regard to 
corporate bond markets, we can imagine that investors prefer variety 
of bonds, and thus, the more kinds of corporate bonds are on the 
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market, the higher their values are.
When there are positive externalities, economic theory tells us that 
the government should interfere with the market in order to increase 
the positive externality. The focus of this paper is how to deal with 
the externality when there are two positive externalities in the 
market: one with dynamic property and the other with static 
property. Moreover, the interaction of these two kinds of externality 
will change the magnitude of government intervention.5 Now let us 
move on to a simple model to consider the government's best policy 
when there are two kinds of externality.
As in Tirole (2006), there is usually no organized market for a 
standard commodity named “2-year bond at 10% interest rate.” 
However, the focus of this paper is about the externality in corporate 
bond markets and every corporate bond is assumed to be the same. 
Suppose there are N firms that need to raise funds in a corporate 
bond market. There are two periods, and so the firms can issue their 
bonds in the first or second period. Firms prefer raising funds in the 
first period, reflecting the opportunity costs. δ, which is greater than 
zero but less than one, is the time preference ratio. Every firm has a 
unit demand for funds which is not divisible.
As stated above, there are two kinds of externality. f (∙) stands for 
the dynamic externality of market making. Suppose that N1 firms 
issued bonds in the first period. Market makers learned a lot about 
how to price and how to evaluate firms' default risks, etc. in the first 
period. Their learning in the first period makes investors in the 
second period believe that the pricing is much better than in the 
first period. This effect will lower the interest rates of the corporate 
bonds issued in the second period, even though the corporate bonds 
are the same. Thus, f ’(∙) is assumed to be positive.
Suppose there is a second kind of network externality in the 
corporate bond market. From the perspectives of investors, a variety 
of corporate bonds means a variety of assets. Of course, the 
investors prefer more variety. This kind of externality is not dynamic. 
The higher the number of corporate bonds in the first period, the 
higher their values are in that period, with no effect on prices in the 
5 These two externalities are somewhat different from two-sided 
externalities as in credit card industries because buyers are not included 
explicitly in the model. Evans (2002) argues that there are two-sided 
externalities in corporate bond markets. Roson (2005) reports that chicken or 
egg problems can rise as a result of two-sided externalities.
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second period. g(∙) represents the externality from variety, with     
g’(∙)＞0. To make the analysis simpler and more interesting, we add 
one more assumption: f”(∙)＜0 and g”(∙)＜0. This is necessary to get 
interior solutions.
The assumptions up to now can be summarized as the following 
equations for the price of corporate bonds. The effects on the price of 
the firm's default risk are normalized to zero. Since every firm is 
assumed to be the same, this normalization is reasonable. Si is the 
subsidy from the government in period i. If Si is negative, it can be 
interpreted as a tax. Firms will choose the period for their bond 
issuance after comparing the two prices.
P1＝f (0)＋g(N1)＋S1
   δP2＝δ f (N1)＋δg(N2)＋δS2
Before considering the social planner's problem, we consider the 
equilibrium. As a starting point, suppose there is only one kind of 
network externality, f (∙), and there is no subsidy from the 
government. In addition, suppose δ equals one. In this situation, 
firms are reluctant to issue bonds in the first period. Rather, they 
want to have a free-ride on the firms who issue their bonds in the 
first period. As a result, there are two equilibria.
(A) All firms issue their bonds in the second period.
(B) One firm issues its bonds in the first period, and the other 
firms in the second period.
The above equilibria show the difficulties in forming well- 
functioning corporate bond markets in East Asia. Note that Case (B) 
is an equilibrium, because every firm does not have any profitable 
deviation. The firm issuing bonds at f (0) in the first period does not 
have profitable deviation because if it goes to the second period, the 
price will be the same f (0). Of course, the N－1 firms benefit from 
the firm who issues its bond in the first period. Their bond's price is 
f (1). If the firm in the first period issues its bond in the second 
period, then every bond's price will be f (0).
However, with the introduction of another kind of externality, g(∙), 
Case (B) cannot be an equilibrium, if g(∙) is not too big.6 Therefore, 
6
For example, f (x)＞g(x＋1) for x∈(0, N) is necessary to remove Case (B) 
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the unique equilibrium is that all firms issue their bonds in the 
second period. If a firm issues its bond in the first period, the price 
would be f (0)＋g(1). Thus, the firm has a profitable deviation of 
issuing its bond in the second period at f (0)＋g(N). The two 
externalities combine to concentrate firms' bond issuance in the 
second period.
δ does not change the above result. If δ＜1 and g(∙)＝0, there 
might be a few firms who want to issue their bonds in the first 
period. Suppose the number of the firms is a, which is a small 
number larger than 1. Then, f (0)≤δ f (a) and f (0)≥δ f (a－1). On the 
other hand, if g(∙)＞0 with the same level of δ, fewer firms will want 
to issue their bonds in the first period. This is because b, the 
number of firms issuing bonds in the first period with positive g(∙), 
should satisfy the following inequalities f (0)＋g(b＋1)≤δ [ f (b)＋      
g(N－b)] and f (0)＋g(b)≥δ [ f (b－1)＋g(N－b＋1)]. Comparing these two 
inequalities and the above two in the case of no static network 
externality tells us that a is greater than b when δ is close to 1.7 
With positive g(∙), fewer firms will choose to issue their bonds in the 
first period. Externality g(∙) precipitates concentration of bond 
issuance together with externality f (∙).
Now consider the problem of the social planner, the government. 
Suppose the government wants to make a well-functioning corporate 
bond market. In the well-functioning market, the interest rates posed 
on corporate bonds will be minimal and the bond prices will be the 
highest. Maximizing the sum of the bond prices is the same as 
maximizing the sum of positive externalities. In the framework of this 
paper, a good market is a market with the highest level of 
externality. The government uses S1 and S2 as ways to achieve the 
policy goal.
In order for the government to achieve its policy goal with the 
lowest budget, it is clear that S2 should be less than or equal to 
from the set of equilibria.
7 This argument can be put in a much simpler way as the following. 
Suppose N is very big and we can treat a and b as real numbers. Then, the 
equilibrium condition of the case without static network externality is 
f (0)＝δ f (a). On the other hand, with static network externality, the 
equilibrium condition boils down to f (0)＋g(b)＝δ [ f (b)＋g(N－b)]. Insert a into 
b's place in both sides of this equation. Since f (0)＝δf (a), we have only to 
compare g(a)＝δg(N－a). Since δ  is close to 1 and thus a is not a big 
number, δg(N－a) is very likely to be greater than g(a).
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zero. Bond issuers in the first period should be subsidized to have 
an incentive to give positive externality to the bond issuers in the 
second period. Suppose that S2 cannot be negative, that is, the 
government cannot tax the bond issuers in the second period. Then, 
the government's problem is choosing S1 in order to maximize the 
positive externality. Let us find the optimal N1, maximizing the 
positive externality first. The government wants to maximize
N1[ f (0)＋g(N1)]＋(N－N1)[δf (N1)＋δg (N－N1)]. The optimal level of N1 is 
the following:
N1
*≡argmaxN1∈{0,1,…,N} N1[ f (0)＋g(N1)]＋δ(N－N1)[ f (N1)＋g(N－N1)].
The optimal level of N1 depends on the value of δ and the specific 
functional forms for f (∙) and g(∙). However, it is clear that the 
optimal N1 is neither zero nor N. The government's objective function 
is a kind of weighted sum of f (∙) and g(∙). If N1 is zero, the dynamic 
externality will be also zero. Though the government has a maximum 
level of g(∙), it is not the maximum of the weighted sum because of 
the assumptions of g”(∙)＜0 and f”(∙)＜0. If N1 is N, there is no firm 
which can enjoy the dynamic externality. The optimal level of N1 will 
be determined by considering the benefits and costs of additional 
bond issuers in the first period. If N1 increases by one unit, the bond 
issuers in the first period will be pleased by the increased variety 
externality and the bond issuers in the second period will also be 
better off because of the increased dynamic externality. However, the 
number of firms which enjoy the positive dynamic externality will 
decrease and the variety externality in the second period will also 
decrease.
Suppose the optimal level of N1 is N1
* and the level of S1 to achieve 
N1
* is S1




*≤δ[ f (N1*)＋g(N－N1*)] and
f (0)＋g(N1
*)＋S1







 is smaller than δP2*＝δf (N1*)＋δg(N－N1*) 
in the equilibrium. If P1
*
≥δP2*, then a bond issuer in the second 
period has the profitable deviation of going to the first period to 
issue its bond, because P1




*. On the other hand, in order for (P1
*, δP2*) to be 
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the equilibrium price, every firm issuing bonds in the first period 
must not have any profitable deviation, that is, P1
*＞δP2*’＝δf (N1*－1)＋
δg(N－N1*＋1). Although it is possible for N1* not to be supported as 
an equilibrium in certain circumstances, we will continue the 
analysis assuming that the functional forms for f (∙) and g(∙) can 
support S1
*
 as the equilibrium price.
Now consider the interaction between the two kinds of externality 
when the government wants to set the optimal S1
*. Rearranging the 
above conditions produce the following inequalities:
[δf (N1*－1)－f (0)]＋[δg(N－N1*＋1)－g(N1*)]≤S1*≤
[δf (N1*)－f (0)]＋[δg(N－N1*)－g(N1*＋1)]
The parts δg(N－N1*＋1)－g(N1*) or δg(N－N1*)－g(N1*＋1) tell us about 
the interaction of the two externalities. The existence of variety 
externality can help or hinder the government's job of making a 
well-functioning bond market. If N1
* is relatively large and δ is not 
close to one, then the existence of variety externality helps the 
government. On the contrary, if N1
* is relatively small or δ is close to 
one, the government has a tougher job of making well-functioning 
bond markets.
IV. Conclusion
To have well-functioning corporate bond markets is important for 
the sustainable growth of East Asia. Government interventions for 
building up markets can be rationalized because building up 
markets does not occur in markets. We can find many policy 
recommendations: rationalizing tax treatment; broadening the 
institutional investor base; improving corporate governance; 
strengthening the regulatory framework; promoting bond market 
centers, etc.
This paper focused on the interaction of the externalities in the 
corporate bond markets. According to the analysis, the government 
should consider the interaction before deciding on its subsidy to the 
market participants. The analysis also tells us that historical studies 
about the development of advanced corporate bond markets as in the 
US are important in the sense that those externalities are not unique 
to the East Asian markets.
The model in the paper has many shortcomings. The model is too 
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simple to make concrete analysis and policy recommendations. In 
addition, the investors are not explicitly modeled. Before including 
the investors as a building block of the model, however, the question 
of whether or not corporate bond markets are two-sided should be 
addressed.
(Received 20 November 2006; Revised 6 February 2007)
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Comments and Discussion
Comments by Sung Wook Joh *8
This paper deals with a very important issue, corporate bond 
markets. While it is generally agreed that East Asian economies need 
to develop bond markets, doing so has been difficult. This paper 
theoretically explains why developing a bond market is difficult. This 
paper consists of two major parts; a review of current bond markets 
in East Asia and a theoretical model explaining the difficulties of 
bond markets with two types of externality. Also the author 
discusses the role of government subsidies in developing a working 
bond market. The paper provides good insights to understand 
important factors, and conditions needed to develop bond markets.
Let's start with the need to develop a well functioning bond 
market. The author emphasize the need for an economy to have a 
“spare tire” when banking sector is in trouble, as we experienced 
during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s. During the crisis period, 
many banks were in trouble and they could not extend or rollover 
their credits to borrowing firms and there was credit rationing. 
Borrowing firms have suffered when main bank is not “healthy.” It is 
argued that borrowing firms need to have another source of raising 
capital in addition to the banking sector.
The author develops a theoretical model explain why firms do not 
issue bonds, explaining the difficulty of establishing a bond market. 
In his model, identical firms choose to issue corporate bonds when 
two types of externality exist: Dynamic externality: learning effect 
and static externality: network (variety) effect. Dynamic externality 
means that as financial intermediaries get more experienced over 
time, their valuation will become better and issuers will get higher 
valuation. Network externality means with a variety of choices, there 
will be more investors willing to purchase these bonds. Facing these 
two externalities, issuing firms (bonds issued) will be smaller than 
the socially optimal number of firms. The author shows that 
* Professor, School of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-746, 
Korea, (Tel) +82-2-880-9384, (Fax) +82-2-876-8411, (E-mail) swjoh@snu.ac.kr
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government can choose a subsidy level for bond issuers to reduce 
the problems associated with these externalities. However, he shows 
that a subsidy does not necessarily yield the socially optimal number 
of issuing firms. 
The model suggests that despite a government subsidy it will be 
difficult to lure firms to issue corporate bonds in an early stage of 
bond markets. It also implies that developing a well working bond 
market is a daunting task. The model would be more convincing if it 
incorporates the fact that firms in reality consider the issuing cost 
and price of bonds compared to the costs of borrowing from banks. 
In addition, it may be necessary to introduce differences in issuing 
firms as the variety effects imply that investors value firm 
differences. Finally, but most importantly, I have to point out that 
externalities mentioned in the paper are not unique to East Asian 
Markets. Other developed countries still face or have faced the 
problems resulting from these externalities. The paper should have 
discussed the mechanisms, and policies that other countries have 
used to overcome these problems.
The need for a bond market in East Asian countries seem to be 
somewhat different from that in developed countries. Consider why 
we need banks from the beginning. In a perfect, complete market, 
the need to financial intermediaries is minimal. In imperfect and 
incomplete market, banks can lower transaction costs compared to 
individual investors, and costs related to asymmetry information. 
When there is information asymmetry between borrower and the 
rest, monitoring and screening activities by banks become important. 
With a repeated relationship with their borrowing firms, banks can 
reduce the costs associated with asymmetry information. This brings 
the importance of relationship banking. 
Relationship banking however may have some problems such as 
soft budget constraints problems, looting problems and information 
monopoly (hold-up problems). Soft budget constraint problems which 
are also called ever-greening problems arise when banks cannot 
credibly deny credit to borrowing firms in trouble. A borrower on the 
verge of defaulting may approach the bank for more credit to 
forestall default. While a new lender would not lend to this borrower, 
a bank that has already loaned money may well decide to extend 
further credit in the hope of recovering its previous loan. Borrowers 
who realize that they can renegotiate their contracts ex post like this 
may have perverse incentives ex ante (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). 
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If renegotiation of a loan agreement is too easy, a borrower may 
exert insufficient effort in preventing a bad outcome from happening. 
Granting seniority to the bank may provide amelioration.
Looting problems (La Porta et al. 2003) occur when borrowing 
firms take advantage of their relationships with creditor banks for 
their own benefits. Using the Mexican banks and borrowing firms, 
LLZ have documented that borrowing firms related with creditor 
banks have borrowed at a lower cost, pledged lower collateral, but 
they defaulted more than firms without relationship. Banks' recovery 
rate from the defaulted borrower with relationship was lower. 
Information monopoly or hold up problems occur when the 
proprietary information about borrowers that banks obtain as part of 
their relationships may give them an information monopoly. Banks 
try to take advantage of the borrowing firms using their information, 
yielding rent extraction (rent sharing). Suppose banks know that the 
borrowing firms have a good project. Since the bank can threaten 
not to extend the loan to the borrowing firm, it faces a “liquidity 
risk” that profitable projects can be liquidated. Banks could charge 
(ex post) high loan interest rates (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). The 
threat of being “locked in,” or informationally captured by the bank, 
may make the borrower reluctant to borrow from the bank. 
Potentially valuable investment opportunities may then be lost. 
There are several solutions to hold-up problems. Firms may opt for 
multiple bank relationships, but incur a cost. Ongena and Smith 
(2000) show that multiple bank relationships indeed reduce the 
hold-up problem, but worsen the availability of credit. Multiple 
relationships can reduce the value of information acquisition to any 
one individual bank (see Boot and Thakor 2000). Multiple 
relationships can cause too much competition ex post, which may 
discourage lending to “young” firms. Multiple creditors can 
complicate debt renegotiation. A long-term line of credit with a 
termination clause can be a potentially superior solution to the 
hold-up problem (Von Thadden 1995) In addition, Diamond (1991) 
and Rajan (1992) argue that public debt or arm's length debt can 
reduce the problem. Here issuing public debt means issuing 
corporate bonds. So a mix of public debt and private debt can 
reduce the problems.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS22
Reference
Bolton, Patrick, and Scharfstein, David. “Optimal Debt Structure 
and the Number of Creditors.” Journal of Political Economy 
104 (No. 1 1996): 1-25.
Boot, Arnoud W.A., and Thakor, Anjan V. “Can Relationship 
Banking Survive Competition.” Journal of Finance 55 (No. 2 
2000): 679-713.
Diamond, Douglas W. “Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice 
between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt.” Journal of 
Political Economy 99 (No. 4 1991): 689-721.
Ongena, Steven, and Smith, David C. “What Detemines the Number 
of Bank Relationships Cross-country Evidence.” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 9 (No. 1 2000): 26-56.
La Porta, Rafael, López-de-Silanes, Florencia, and Zamarripa, 
Guillermo. “Related Lending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
118 (No. 1 2003): 231-68.
Rajan, Raghuram G. “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between 
Informed and Arm's-length Debt.” Journal of Finance 47 (No. 
4 1992): 1367-400.
Sharpe, Steven. “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and 
Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer 
Relationships.” Journal of Finance 45 (1990): 1069-87.
Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig. “Long Term Contracts, Short Term 
Investment and Monitoring.” Review of Economics Studies 62 
(No. 4 1995): 557-75.
